When premiums are community-rated, risk adjustment (RA) serves to mitigate competitive insurers' incentive to select favorable risks. However, unless fully prospective, it also undermines their incentives for efficiency.
Introduction
When premiums are community-rated, risk adjustment (RA) is introduced in order to reduce competitive insurers' incentive to select favorable risks. On the other hand, unless fully prospective, it undermines their incentive for efficiency (Ellis and Van de Ven [2000] ). This goal conflict has been addressed by Van Barneveld et al. [2001] , who estimate optimal thresholds in the cost distribution beyond which risk adjustment sets in. However, the implementation of such a rule becomes difficult when the distribution of health care expenditure (HCE) not only shifts over time (e.g. due to a particularly high rate of cost increase in the hospital sector) but also differs between insurers (e.g. due to more or less reliance on Managed-Care options). Therefore, as a rough-and-ready measure, one might consider simply capping the volume of RA. In this way, one exposes insurers to some residual financial risk. At the same time, there is dissatisfaction with the performance of current RA formulas (Van de Ven et al. [2003] ). The expectation is that by adding risk adjusters, incentives for risk selection could be reduced even more. However, refinements of the RA formula quite likely cause the volume of RA to increase. They therefore are in conflict with the desire to preserve efficiency through capping the volume of RA. These amounts were seen as incompatible with the efficiency goal by the Swiss Council of States, who proposed to limit the volume of RA to its 2004 volume (for the first capping-proposal see Spycher [2000] ). At the same time, parliament decided to add the criterion, "Hospitalization or living in a nursing home during the previous year" ("hospitalization" henceforth) to the RA formula, effective 2012. This decision was influenced by Beck et al. [2006] , who had found that this criterion serves to substantially reduce insurers' payoff to risk selection.
With this backdrop, the present contribution purports to achieve two objectives.
First, it seeks to establish the opportunity cost of capping the volume of RA in terms of increased incentives for risk selection. Second, it investigates the con-1 sequences of complementing the RA formula by the criterion "hospitalization".
Note that the volume of RA is measured in two ways throughout this paper, drawing on the analogy between RA and a levy (and a subsidy, respectively). In the economics of taxation, a distinction is consistently made between those who pay a levy and those who ultimately bear it. In the case of RA, payments into the scheme are ultimately borne by the favorable risks whose premiums exceed the (estimated) actuarially fair value. They cross-subsidize the premiums of unfavorable risks to the tune of CHF 4.8 bn. insurers from an estimated 1.1 to 0.98 bn. To minimize the associated incentives for insurers to increase their risk-selection efforts, the new RA values have to be the higher, the greater the differences between group-specific values prior to the limitation and the greater the group's population share.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a description of the data basis, descriptive statistics, and checks of the representativeness of the data. Section 3 shows how the volumes of cross-subsidization In all cantons, the calculated volumes of CS (see Table 1 ) and RA fall short of the official ones. The difference is smallest in the canton of Zurich (ZH), Lucerne According to Table 3 , every canton would exhibit an increase. To put these into perspective, note that premiums e.g. in the canton of Zurich were CHF 4,000.
Therefore, the per-capita cross-subsidy of CHF 870 would have attained almost 22 percent of premium under the new RA formula.
Moreover, the change would have completely overthrown the customary CS age and gender profiles. Whereas under the current RA formula, the young of both genders are burdened to the benefit of those beyond age 60, the new formula causes hospitalization to become the crucial determinant of CS values. 
Limiting the volume of risk adjustment
The volumes of cross-subsidization and risk adjustment have increased significantly since 1996 (see On the one hand, rapid growth of RA volume may be the consequence of increases of risk-selection effort in excess of HCE growth. On the part of insurers, this is the predicted response to increasing discrepancies between risk-based premiums and imposed community rating (see Zweifel [2007] for a theoretical development).
According to Table 2 , this may well have been the case since the increase in variance of HCE (reflected by the standard error of cross-subsidies) is mainly associated with age (and hence, higher HCE). With HCE growing rapidly from 1996 to 2005 (see Table 4 again), its variance likely grew as well and with it the gap between actuarially fair and community-rated premiums. On the part of consumers, the favorable risks they may well have stepped up their efforts at avoiding the rapidly increasing burden of cross-subsidization. One way was to opt for higher deductibles and Managed-Care options because insurers, while not permitted to pass on the full savings, still could pass on more than the "true" savings after deduction of risk-selection effects (which amount to between oneand two-thirds of the full savings in the case of Managed-Care, as estimated in Lehmann and Zweifel [2004] ). As stated in Section 2, both contractual variants gained a great deal of market share just between 2001 and 2005. This interpretation points to activities designed to circumvent premium regulation. They could be reigned by perfecting the RA scheme. Recall that with perfect RA, insurers would not be able to offer a share of their "fake" savings to consumers who seek to dodge the cross-subsidy. This consideration motivated the Swiss parliament to pass a refinement of the RA formula by including the hospitalization criterion.
On the other hand, such a refinement causes CS and RA volumes to increase substantially, as evidenced in Section 3. The consequence is to increasingly shelter insurers from financial risk undermining their incentive to improve efficiency.
Moreover, risk adjustment seems to have become a redistributive scheme with a life of its own. Indeed, the CS volume in favor of the old grew even faster than the 80 percent shown in Table 4 (not evidenced here), which was not anticipated.
These considerations motivated the Swiss Council of States to propose capping the RA volume at its 2004 value (CHF 4.8 bn.).
As a certainly second-best measure, capping the volume of RA (or indeed CS) is considered below. A simple limit in nominal terms would even have the advantage of increasing insurers' risk exposure over time, forcing them to step up their efficiency-enhancing efforts. It could be imposed at three levels, the aggregate (broken down to insurers according to market share, which may be changing over time), the individual insurer (fixed over time), and the consumer (limiting directly the amount of cross-subsidization). Only a cap on total RA volume will be considered because it is invariant to changes in market share and structure.
A question that naturally arises at this point is who bears the consequences of a cap. Three parties can be identified.
• • The insurers. In a system with community-rated premiums, risk adjustment is introduced to eliminate (or reduce) incentives for risk selection. Capping its volume (directly or indirectly through limiting CS) causes insurers not to be fully compensated anymore for enrolling unfavorable risks. In the Swiss context, there are two predicted responses. One is to eschew high risks, using known means such as losing application forms. The other is to form conglomerates with a shared sales office (see Van 
de Ven et al. [2003]).
Potential clients are quickly assessed on the telephone and assigned to a low-premium affiliate if found a low risk or a high-premium one otherwise.
While the lower risks are happy to accept, the high ones often prefer to accept the higher premium to overcoming the hurdles erected by conventional competitors with their lower community-rated premium. Although this practice is not in the spirit of the law, it is legal because each affiliate of the conglomerate does charge a uniform premium.
• The cantons. Capping risk adjustment increases the financial burden of cantons with an unfavorable risk structure because the cantons pay part of the subsidies to those (in part high-risk) citizens whose premiums exceed a certain share of their income. However, the federal government is affected as well through matching grants.
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Optimizing the cap on the volume of risk adjustment
The preceding section has shown that capping the volume of risk adjustment has opportunity costs in terms of increased risk-selection efforts on the part of both insurers and consumers. This gives rise to an optimization problem: How is the cap to be allocated to minimize its opportunity cost? The development below focuses on insurers' incentive for risk selection, neglecting changes in consumer behavior in response to reduced cross-subsidies.
Swiss risk adjustment is based on age and gender. Its values are calculated in the following way,
where a and g are indexes for age and gender categories, RA a,g is the payment to (RA a,g < 0) or from (RA a,g > 0) risk adjustment in group (a, g),L a,g is average HCE in group (a, g), andL is average HCE paid by insurers in the population as a whole. The volume of risk adjustment (V ) can then be calculated as in Equation (2),
where n is the number of insureds of risk group with age a and gender g. RA payments are considered in absolute values to avoid canceling out positive and negative values. However, this makes the division by two necessary to avoid double counting.
Favorable risks contribute to the insurer's margin, which can be used to cover the deficits generated by unfavorable risks. The insurer is exposed to a higher risk of insolvency if these deficits are large. Reserves can be used to ensure solvency, but too many outliers endanger the economic survival of the insurer. There are several methods for analyzing the importance of such outliers, such as value at risk or expected loss at risk (see Hull [2006] ). However, the easiest way to proceed is to analyze the variance of HCE falling on the insurer.
If one considers age and gender as the only determinants of HCE (which is in accord with current Swiss risk adjustment), then variance in HCE across these groups is given by
whereL is total average HCE in a specific canton (recall that risk adjustment is calculated in each canton separately), andL a,g is average HCE of a specific age and gender cell. As of 2006, s 2 L is estimated by Beck et al. [2006] at CHF 12 bn. Risk adjustment thus serves to reduce the variance of HCE falling on insurers (and therefore mitigate the incentive to "skim the cream"). This can be seen by plugging Equation (1) into Equation (3) and rearranging terms,
and hence,
Equation (5) V ≤V ,
2 Note, however, in both cases (s 2 HI =0 or s 2 HI =c, where c is a constant) the results for the optimization problem is the same, since a constant cancels out when taking derivatives.
13 withŝ 2 HI denoting the variance when volume is capped. Of course the optimization must take into account that risk adjustment is zero sum. This however is always achieved since positive and negative RA values cancel out.
If volume is defined as in Equation (2) 
Because s 2 HI is predetermined, it is obvious that only the terms in brackets are relevant. The first term can be broken down as shown in Equation (8),
The symbols are defined as follows,
Here, RA a,g > 0 if the insurer receives a payment from the RA scheme and consumers in the (a, g) cell receive a cross-subsidy. Conversely, RA a,g < 0 if it pays into the scheme (and low-risk consumers bear a cross-subsidy).
Since the restriction V ≤V always holds as an equality in Equation (6), the problem can be solved using a Lagrangian,
where the subscript HI is dropped for simplicity. The solution to this problem shows how positive payments received from the RA scheme are optimally reduced.
Payments into the scheme ( RA a,g < 0) are fully analogous. The first-order conditions are,
This is a system of linear equations in RA a,g and λ that has full rank and can therefore be solved. An example with four risk classes is given as follows.
Assume a hypothetical RA scheme distinguishing four groups i = 0, 1, 2, 3 with n i the number of individuals in that group and n the overall number of individuals.
Let two groups (0 and 1) have below-average and two (2 and 3), above-average expected HCE. RA i indicates risk adjustment payments for each group. The firstorder conditions for negative payments (i.e. payments to the RA scheme, groups 0 and 1) are,
Now λ can be solved for from the first FOC,
Equation (13) shows the determinants of the opportunity cost caused by the cap.
First, the greater the population at risk (n), the smaller this cost. Second, the greater the difference between RA payments with and without the cap (RA 0 − RA 0 ), the higher this cost. In addition, the system (12) can be solved to yield,
RA 0 n 0 + RA 1 n 1 =V .
It is evident that the optimal reduction of RA values are the same across risk categories. Solving this system of two equations in the two unknowns yields the following solution payments to the RA scheme,
with h i noting the share of group i in the subpopulation with below-average HCE.
Therefore, the optimal new RA values are
• the lower, the lower the cap is set;
• the lower, the greater the positive difference in RA values prior to the limitation (e.g. RA 1 > RA 0 );
• the higher, the greater the negative difference in RA values prior to the limitation (e.g. RA 0 < RA 1 );
• the higher, the higher the group's population share h i (even for small n 0
The payments received from the RA scheme can be derived in an analogous way.
Consequences of capping risk adjustment
As argued in Sections 1 and 2, risk-selection behavior is ultimately driven by the amount of cross-subsidization contained in contributions to health insurance. And in the case of Switzerland, the political debate revolving around risk adjustment has focused on the CS rather than the RA volume. For these reasons, this section cites more CS rather than RA figures.
Theoretical considerations
The question as to the optimal value of the cap cannot be addressed in this paper.
It requires knowledge of citizens' willingness to pay for avoiding risk-selection efforts by health insurers while keeping community-rated premiums. Experimental While the political debate has focused on the national level, cantons will likely be affected as well. As evident from Equations (9) and (11), the opportunity cost of a cap on risk adjustment is linked to the dispersion of HCE, which varies between cantons. If CS an RA volumes were to be limited, many citizens with low incomes would have to pay higher premiums. This creates political pressure for increased redistribution through premium subsidies. More generous cantons would be more prone to increasing their subsidies, which are matched by the federal level, where a substantial amount of redistribution between cantons takes place. Therefore, a limit on CS and RA volumes is likely to induce a certain amount of cross-subsidization between cantons.
Focusing on the opportunity cost of a cap in terms of incentives when an additional adjuster is introduced, there are two effects to be distinguished. First, since HCE is now predicted more precisely, the variance of HCE borne by insurers decreases and with it risk-selection effort. Second, unless the additional adjuster exhibits perfectly negative correlation with the existing ones, CS and RA volumes must increase. However, the incidence of hospitalization increases with age and is higher among women than men; therefore volumes increase. This increase affects the opportunity cost, depending on the situation.
• The benchmark case is no cap, combined with the introduction of the hospitalization criterion into the RA formula. This simply reduces the variance in HCE to be borne by insurers, thus mitigating incentives for risk selection [see Equation (4)].
• The cap is imposed but not binding initially; it becomes binding with the introduction of the additional RA criterion. Therefore the opportunity cost of the cap was zero at the beginning. It would become positive but still small if the CS volume had to be reduced from CHF 4.6 to 4.5 bn. since the effect on insurer behavior is still limited. However, a future reduction from CHF 6 to 4.5 bn. (say), would cause opportunity cost to rise [see Equation (13)].
• The third alternative is the introduction of the additional RA criterion when the cap is already binding. On the one hand, this would serve to reduce the volatility of HCE falling on health insurers. On the other hand, the restriction on CS volume becomes even more binding. The first effect mitigates incentives for risk selection, while the second strengthens them. The net effect remains ambiguous [see Equation (4) and (13), respectively].
Note that CS and RA volumes can always be reduced by permitting health insurers to charge premiums that are more in line with true risk. For example, suppose smokers pay an additional premium of CHF 50 per year. This would decrease the difference between HCE and premium revenue by CHF 50 ceteris paribus and hence the variance of payments and with it the risk to be borne by the health insurer. Incentives for risk selection decrease. The advantage of more risk-rated premiums is that RA volume declines endogenously without inducing more efforts at risk selection; its drawback is deviating from community-rating. Conversely, the advantage of capping CS and RA volumes is that community-rating can be retained, while its downside is that incentives for risk selection are strengthened.
Empirical illustration
Since the unit of reference for Swiss risk adjustment is the canton, the effects of limiting its volume can be exemplified by using data for the canton of Zurich, estimated HCE seem to fit the Swiss average sufficiently well to derive estimates of the effect a cap on CS volume may have, assuming that it is imposed in a way as to minimize its opportunity cost (as expounded in Section 5). Table 5 illustrates the effects of a reduction of CS from CHF 5.375 bn. to CHF 4.5
bn. for the canton of Zurich (number of insured: 1,032,600). Initially the youngest age class of women pays a premium that exceeds expected HCE by some CHF 1,600, used to finance the higher HCE of Zurich residents above 50 years of age.
Capping the CS volume would reduce this excess by CHF 236. On the other hand, the highest age group of females currently receives more than CHF 11,000
as a cross-subsidy. This would be reduced by CHF 435. An exception is the class of 51-55 year old women, which changes from receivers to neutral. 3 These amounts are to be compared with the average Zurich premium, which was about CHF 4,000 in 2005. Note: 1 CHF = 0.83 USD (2007) Naturally, capping the CS volume has an impact on insurers operating in the canton of Zurich as well. First, the decrease in CS values evidenced in Table 5 implies an increase in the deviations between actual and average HCE falling on them.
Therefore, the variance of HCE borne by them (s 2 HI in Section 5) is bound to increase, very likely triggering additional risk-selection efforts on this part. This effect would even be more pronounced if the cap on CS and RA volumes were to be imposed in a non-optimal way. Second, the amount of RA transferred between insurers would fall. This effect was estimated in the following way. Equation (1) for determining RA values was implemented using the estimated HCE function Table 6 ).
For simplicity, the simulated RA values with the CS cap were not optimized [implementing the equation system (11) would constitute a research paper of its own] but simply allocated evenly to the age/gender/hospitalization status cells of insurers according to their shares in current RA volume. Thus, the cap on CS volume would reduce the RA volume by an estimated 12.5 percent. This is markedly less than the 16.3 percent reduction of CS volume because a great deal of cross-subsidization occurs between consumers enrolled in a given fund.
Conclusions
This contribution addresses the conflict of interest arising in the context of imperfect risk adjustment (RA). On the one hand, a refinement of the RA formula would weaken health insurers' incentive to engage in risk selection (given that they are subject to community rating). On the other hand, unless fully prospective, risk adjustment undermines their quest for efficiency. There are three novel aspects to this paper. First, it adopts standard economic theorizing by distinguishing between the insures who pay (through their contributions to the RA scheme) and the favorable risks who ultimately bear these cross-subsidies (CS), amounting to the difference between their actual and their actuarially fair premium. Second, as a rough-and-ready measure to expose insurers to a degree of financial risk, a cap on risk adjustment is considered and the resulting optimization problem studied.
The issue is to structure the reduced RA values in a way as to minimize the increase of HCE variance borne by the insurer (and hence risk-selection effort).
Third, the study simulates the consequences of a cap (on total CS rather than RA volume) both for consumers and insurers.
In a first step, data provided by three Swiss health insurers are compared to official nationwide averages to assess their representativeness. Overall, the data seem to accord with official statistics to a sufficient degree to justify more detailed investigation.
Next, the refinement of the Swiss RA formula effective 2012 is considered. The inclusion of the additional criterion, "Hospitalization or living in a nursing home during the previous year", is found to inflate CS volume by 40 percent on average and to cause age and gender to lose importance as risk adjusters throughout. 
